back of the queue' in trade talks with the United States.
These observations point to the importance of cost-benefit calculations, feelings of attachment to a wider community and cues from political elites in shaping the outcome of the 2016 referendum-three sets of explanations that have received significant attention in academic studies of the drivers of public attitudes to the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005; see also Hobolt and de Vries 2016) . In this article we draw on data gathered in a national panel survey conducted just before and immediately after the June 23rd referendum to investigate what motivated the vote for Brexit. Was the vote to leave the EU motivated primarily by instrumental considerations over the perceived costs and benefits of EU membership? Or was it driven more strongly by feelings of national identity and anxiety over perceived threats to the native in-group, from immigration and the free movement of EU nationals? Furthermore, how influential were cues from prominent politicians, such as David Cameron, Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, in motivating people to vote, either for remain or leave? After providing a brief overview of existing research on public attitudes towards the European Union, we address these questions in a multivariate analysis of the vote for Brexit.
What Drives Public Attitudes toward the EU?
The 2016 referendum was the second such event to ask UK citizens about their preferred relationship with Europe. The first, which asked voters whether they wanted to stay in the Common Market, as it was then called, was held in 1975 and saw the country endorse continued membership by a strong two to one margin (Butler and Kitzinger 1976) . The fortyone years between the two referendums witnessed the development of a sizable literature on factors that shape public attitudes toward the EU (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998; Marks, 2005, Maier and Rittberger, 2008; Armingeon and Ceka, 2014) . These studies explore a range of factors, including the influence of parties and elites on public opinion (e.g. Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries, 2007; Ray, 2003) , the effects of media coverage of the EU on support for integration (Vliegenthart et al. 2008) , the influence of national identities in shaping public attitudes (Carey, 2002) , and the role of the economy in influencing support for further integration (Gabel and Whitten, 1997) . Hooghe and Marks (2005) provided a succinct summary of findings on what drives public attitudes towards European integration in their paper: 'Calculation, Community and Cues'. They conclude that attitudes are driven by three broad factors. First are calculations about perceived costs and benefits of integration, which vary according to who are seen to be the 'winners or losers' in this process. Second are community considerations that relate principally to social identities, with people who subscribe to a more exclusive national identity being significantly more Eurosceptic than those who acknowledge multiple identities, such as feeling 'British' and 'European'. Third are cues or heuristics that voters use when forming opinions about the EU. These cues include images of party leaders and other prominent politicians as well as partisan attachments and ideological predispositions. Cost-benefit calculations of European integration take different forms. Some of the earliest research stressed the importance of the objective social characteristics of individuals, such as their occupational status and educational backgrounds (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel 1998; Inglehart, 1970) . People with high status occupations who possess significant human capital tend to benefit from lower trade barriers and the increased geographical mobility of labour brought about by enhanced European integration. In contrast, individuals with low status, poorly paid occupations and few educational qualifications find themselves in competition with similarly low-skilled labour from EU member states. This limits job opportunities and drives down wages. As a result, high status individuals are likely to support EU integration, whereas lower status people are likely to oppose it (Gabel and Palmer, 1995) . Recent research also suggests that high levels of education have become a more influential driver of support for the EU over time, with the less well-educated becoming less supportive (Hakhverdian et al. 2013) . Others also have produced evidence which suggests that individual economic cost-benefit analyses have become increasingly important for explaining public reactions to the EU since the eruption of the 2008 financial meltdown and ensuing Eurozone crisis (Hobolt and Wratil 2015) .
In their multi-country time-series analysis of attitudes towards EU integration Gabel and Whitten (1997) found that national inflation rates negatively affected support for EU integration over a five-year period in the 1980s. They also found that measures such as trade relationships between countries within the EU encouraged positive support for integration.
However, their analysis indicated that subjective judgments about economic conditions were significantly more important than the objective performance of economies, a finding that echoes results from the economic voting literature (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Clarke et al., 2009) .
Regarding community, a number of studies demonstrate how attitudes toward EU membership and integration are influenced by attachments to one's culture and society, as well as by a 'fear of others' which plays a significant role in defining identities (Carey 2002; McLaren 2006) . Research on support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP), for example, has documented the impact of anxiety over the perceived negative effects of immigration (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015; Clarke et al., 2016) . Hooghe and Marks (2004) suggest that national identity is more important than economic calculations when it comes to shaping attitudes about EU integration, a finding supported in later studies (e.g. Boomgaarden et al., 2011) . However, the evidence on the effects of identity is mixed, with positive relationships existing between Scottish and Welsh identities and support for European integration (Haesly, 2001 ). Similar findings have been obtained in studies of other European countries, particularly in Eastern Europe (Maier and Rittberger, 2008) . Equally, in a laboratory experiment Vossing (2015) found that individuals with exclusive national identities were more likely to be influenced by elites in forming their attitudes to European integration than individuals with mixed identities, suggesting that opinions can be quite volatile.
In Britain, one of the striking features of attitudes to membership of the EU is how volatile these attitudes can be (Whiteley et al. 2013; Clarke et al., 2016) . In this respect, the findings of earlier research are noteworthy. In their analysis of referendums on European integration Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) showed that the votes held to ratify the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the Single Market were best interpreted as public reactions to short-term, national and domestic issues rather than longer-term considerations about the overall future of the EU. Thus, the unpopularity of the governments in Denmark and France helped to ensure a rejection of the treaty in the former country and near rejection in the latter. Franklin and his colleagues contrast this with Ireland which had a more popular government at the time and where the referendum passed easily.
Subsequent work confirmed that attitudes to the EU are closely tied to domestic political issues and policy-making (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; Marsh 2015 
Theoretical Perspectives
Based on the 'Calculations, Communities and Cues' framework outlined above we would expect that voting in the 2016 referendum on EU membership is influenced by each of these three factors, but with some amendments to the analysis. Considering calculations first, this is commonly viewed as a 'soft' rational choice exercise in which voters evaluate the benefits of EU membership, often focusing on the economy and their own personal circumstances, then weigh these benefits against perceived costs. The present analysis takes this perspective into account using a battery of indicators designed to capture how benefit-cost calculations affected decision-making in the referendum.
As the referendum campaign and its aftermath revealed, public attitudes to EU membership also have a strong emotional component. Although some people have a strong affinity with the concept of being a member of a wider community, others strongly resist this idea. Recent research on affective reasoning suggests that emotional aspects of decisionmaking have substantial effects on the political choices that people make (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen, 2000; Neuman, Marcus, Crigler and MacKuen, 2007; Garry, 2013 (Gigerenzer, 2008; Kahneman, 2011) . Accordingly, we incorporate a measure of perceptions of the risks of leaving the EU into our analyses.
We analyze community influences on attitudes to the EU using data on perceptions of voters' identifications as British, English, Scottish, Welsh, European or something else. As 
Data and Methods
The data employed to study the determinants of voting in the EU referendum were generated by a national panel survey 4 conducted as part of the Essex Continuous Monitoring Survey.
The first wave of the survey was in the field from the 18 th to 20 th of June and the second wave was conducted shortly after the referendum on June 27 th to June 29 th . The sample sizes for the pre-and post-referendum waves were N = 2218 and N = 1993, respectively. The panel design is well-suited for studying how various factors affected voting in the referendum.
Voting behaviour was measured in the post-referendum wave while, with the exception of campaign contacts, all of the predictor variables were measured in the pre-referendum wave.
Measuring variables of interest in this way helps to alleviate threats to inference which can bedevil analyses that rely on cross-sectional survey data .
Results
In the pre-referendum wave of the Essex CMS referendum panel survey, 46.4 per cent of respondents intending to vote reported that they would vote Remain and 47.9 per cent indicated they would vote Leave, with the remaining 5.8 per cent saying they 'didn't know'.
If, as discussed earlier, many in the latter group ultimately would decide to stick with the status quo, these numbers suggest that Remain might have been able to secure a narrow victory. Of course, that did not happen-on June 23rd, 51.9% voted Leave and 48.1% voted
Remain. Vote totals in the post-election election wave of our survey closely mirrored the result, with 50.7 per cent stating they had voted Leave and 49.3 per cent saying that they had voted Remain.
5
In the earlier discussion we argued that benefit-cost considerations were likely to be very important for explaining the vote. Confirmatory factor analysis (Acock, 2013 ) is used to summarize the perceived benefits and costs of leaving the EU. This analysis suggested that two factors could provide a useful representation of the data. The results shows that items focusing on the economy and Britain's influence in the world load heavily on factor one, while items focusing on immigration and security issues load heavily on factor two. Factor scores derived from this analysis are employed in the multivariate modelling presented below. indicates 'no risk' and 10 'very risky'. As the figure illustrates, risk perceptions were widely dispersed. Although the mean score (5.6) was very close to the scale's mid-point (5), opinion was tilted towards the 'risky' end, with a majority (54 per cent) assigning scores of six of greater. In contrast, only one-third (33 per cent) gave scores below the mid-point, thereby indicating that they did not think the risks would be as severe. If risk assessments influenced referendum voting, the expectation is that the more risk people perceived the less likely they were to prefer Brexit.
( Figure 4 about here)
The community aspect of attitudes to membership was measured by a question which asked respondents if they felt 'British', 'English', 'Scottish', 'Welsh', 'European', or some other nationality. Forty-eight per cent described themselves as 'British' with 33 per cent describing themselves as 'English', 6 per cent as Scottish and 3 per cent as 'Welsh'. Only 3.5 per cent described themselves as 'European' with a further 6 per cent choosing another national identity or saying they 'didn't know'. The expectation is that national identities will influence the vote. Compared with those identifying themselves as British, we expect those thinking of themselves as English or Welsh will be less favourable towards EU membership whereas those identifying themselves as European of Scottish will be more favourable. This is because the former identities are narrower than a more inclusive identity of being 'British'.
In the case of Scotland, however, the recent upsurge of nationalism flips this relationship with many seeing EU membership as an attractive alternative to staying in the UK.
The cues component of the model was measured by asking respondents to rate several prominent politicians using 11-point (0-10) 'likeability' scales, where zero means 'strongly dislike' and ten means 'strongly like'. These scales have proved very useful in summarizing important leader image traits, such as competence, honesty, responsiveness and trustworthiness (Clarke et al. 2009; Whiteley et al., 2013) . The hypothesis is that respondents will be more responsive to cues provided by leaders they like rather than those they dislike. In addition, three other predictor variables were specified. Both the economic-influence and immigration-terrorism benefit-cost factors played very significant roles in explaining the vote to leave. Table 1 shows that respondents who were optimistic about the economy and Britain's role in the world if the country were to exit the EU were much more likely to vote Leave (p < .001). Similarly, those who believed that that Britain would be better able to control immigration and counter terrorist threats if it were not part of the EU were more likely to vote Leave (p < .01). As also expected, perceptions of risks associated with leaving the EU have a highly significant impact (p < .001) on referendum voting-respondents who thought that Brexit was risky were much less likely to opt to leave than those who minimized the risks. Emotional reactions to the EU were significant (p < .001) as well; positive reactions to the EU stimulated a vote to remain, whereas negative emotions promoted a leave vote. In addition, and again as expected, those who designated the EU as an important issue were more likely to vote to leave (p < .05).
The national identity measures are not statistically significant with the sole exception of Scottish identifiers, who were less likely to vote to leave than were those who identified themselves as British (see Table 1 ). Equally, socio-demographic characteristics had no effect apart from a very modest tendency (p < .10) for individuals in higher socio-economic grades The explanatory power of various statistically significant predictors is charted in Figure 5 . Since the binomial logit model of referendum voting has a nonlinear functional form, interpretation of the strength of predictor variables is not straightforward (Long and Freese, 2014) . To provide intuition, we assess the impact of a change in a predictor variable from its minimum to its maximum value on the probability of casting a Leave ballot while holding all other predictors constant at their mean values. Figure 5 documents that the economics-international influence and immigration-terrorism benefit-cost variables had the strongest effects on referendum voting. As the former moved from negative (very high costs, very low benefits of leaving) to positive (very low costs, very high benefits of leaving), the probability of voting Leave increased by fully .88 points (on a 0-1 scale). The latter also was very powerful-as benefit-cost calculations regarding immigration and terrorism moved from negative to positive, the likelihood of voting Leave increased by .75 points.
( Figure 5 about here) Predictably, risk perceptions had the opposite impact of benefit-cost calculations.
Changing perceptions of risks associated with leaving the EU from their minimum to their maximum reduced the probability of voting for Brexit by .71. This indicates that risk orientations were a very influential factor in the referendum, even though their effect was not enough to change the result, as 'LeDuc's law' would suggest. Emotional reactions to membership also exerted sizable effects, with a shift from purely negative emotions about EU membership to purely positive ones reducing the probability of a Brexit ballot by .52 points.
Leader image cues provided by Farage and Johnson were influential too-in both cases, as feelings about these two figures moved from negative to positive along the 0-10 'likeability' scale, the probability of voting Leave increased by .44 points. Other effects were less powerful, with Scottish identity reducing the likelihood of voting to leave by .32 points, while identification of Europe as an important issue increased it by .14 points. The influence of Conservative partisanship was very weak, reducing the probability of a Leave vote by .07
points.
Additional insight regarding the ability of various classes of predictor variables to account for voting in the referendum is provided by the statistics summarized in Figure 6 . Table 1 above) has better fit statistics (R 2 = .90, AIC = 658.02) than any of its sub-models. Taken together, these statistics document important effects of benefit-cost perceptions, risk assessments and leader images on voting in the EU referendum. However, they also testify that the strongest 6 When examining these numbers note that larger R 2 and smaller AIC values indicate that a model has greater explanatory power compared to its rivals. explanation is provided by the composite model that incorporates all of the predictor variables.
( Figure 6 about here) Table 2 steps back from the vote and examine the effects of several predictor variables on the benefit-cost scales, the two most important predictors in the vote model. In addition to predictors from the vote model, we also include a variable measuring negative attitudes towards immigration and a variable tapping perceptions that Britain has lost control of its economy to the EU. Since the dependent variables are continuous factor scores, model parameters are estimated using OLS regression.
( Table 2 about here) Both models in Table 2 The partisanship measures show that Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat party identifications cued voters in expected ways, increasing perceptions of the benefits and reducing perceptions of the costs of remaining in the EU. Interestingly, the Conservative partisanship effects were weak, unlike those of Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This was probably because the Tories were so divided on the issue, and this served to weaken the ability of Conservative partisanship to cue voters about costs and benefits of membership.
Finally, there is weak evidence that the Remain campaign had an impact on perceptions of benefits and costs, whereas the Leave campaign appeared to have none.
Although, with the exception of viewing oneself as Scottish, national identities did not have directly influence referendum voting, these identities did have a variety of modest but significant effects on benefit-cost evaluations. English identifiers were significantly more likely than those who viewed themselves as 'British' to emphasize the benefits rather than the costs of exiting the EU. The opposite was true for Scottish and European identifiers. Welsh identifiers were an intermediate case; they were no different from British identifiers regarding economic-influence benefit-cost evaluations, but were significantly more likely to have positive immigration-terrorism evaluations.
Negative attitudes towards immigration had highly significant effects (p < .001) on both types of benefit-cost assessments. As anticipated, voters with highly negative attitudes about immigration were more likely than other people to extol the benefits of Brexit and to minimize the costs of doing so. This effect obtained not only for the immigration-terrorism benefit-cost factor but also for the economy-international influence factor. Perceptions that Britain's economic sovereignty had been lost to the EU mattered as well. Again, the effects are predictable; those who believed the EU had seized control of the British economy were more likely than other voters to see the benefits and minimize the costs of Brexit.
Finally, the performance of the socio-demographic characteristics is noteworthy. As Table 3 documents, university educated people and those in higher social grades were significantly less likely to see the benefits of leaving in the EU than were other people. In contrast, older voters were more likely to judge that Brexit would have benefits by helping to control immigration and reducing the threat of terrorism. Gender differences in benefit-cost assessments were small and insignificant.
( Table 3 about here) Next, we model the effects of various predictors on perceptions of risk, the third most important predictor of voting in the referendum. Using OLS regression for this purpose, we see that the model fits the data very well, with the R 2 indicating that 69 per cent of the variance in risk assessments is explained (Table 3) . Two highly significant predictors (p < .001) in this model are negative attitudes towards immigration and perceptions that Britain no longer controls its own economy. Parameter estimates show that negative attitudes towards immigration tended to dampen perceptions that leaving the EU would be risky. This was also true of perceptions that Britain has lost control of its economy to the EU.
Leader images were highly significant (p < .001) predictors of risk orientations as well. As one would anticipate, positive feelings about Cameron and Corbyn were associated with greater perceived risks of leaving the EU, whereas the positive feelings about Farage and Johnson were associated with lower perceived risks. Partisan identifications were significant too (p < .001) with Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat identifiers thinking that the risks of leaving the EU were higher than did other party identifiers or nonidentifiers.
Of the other predictors, the only significant national identity variable was 'European' (p < .05). As expected, those viewing themselves as European rather than British were more likely to believe that exiting the EU would entail substantial risks. Among sociodemographics, age has a highly significant (p < .001) impact, with younger people being more likely to emphasize risks attendant upon Brexit. Education, gender and social class are not statistically significant. In the next section, we use the results of the multivariate analyses to consider a factor that might have been particularly important for producing the referendum result.
Boris and Brexit
Viewed generally, the analyses presented above indicate that a wide variety of factors worked to shape the decisions that voters made in the EU referendum. Some of these factors, such as attitudes towards immigration and national identities, were established features of the psychology of the electorate when the referendum began. As such, their effects on referendum voting were largely 'baked in' before the campaign began. However, this is not true for cueing effects associated with leader images. The way leader cues played depended, to a substantial extent, on how they were presented to voters during the campaign. As we have seen, leader images had a variety of strong effects in models of forces that affected the referendum outcome.
Of the various leaders, effects associated with Boris Johnson, the high-profile and the Leave direction. These numbers indicate that over half the active electorate were at least lukewarm about the former mayor and, if they were otherwise average, they had a better than even probability of voting Leave. Although the close division of the vote on June 23rd means that it is not possible to say that 'Boris was wot done it'-as documented above, many factors influenced the vote-his boisterous presence was clearly very advantageous to the Leave side whose only other salient leader was the widely unpopular Nigel Farage.
Conclusion: Voting in the EU Referendum Reconsidered
This paper has investigated the factors that shaped the decisions voters made in the historic 2016 referendum on the UK's continued membership in the European Union. Using data gathered in a national panel survey conducted before and after the referendum, and drawing on the wider pan-European literature on what shapes public attitudes to the EU, we employed multivariate models to assess the strength of various forces affecting the vote.
Our results emphasize the importance of benefit-cost calculations, risk assessments and emotional reactions to EU membership as proximate predictors of referendum voting. In McKelvey R 2 = .90 Percentage Voters correctly classified = 93.2 Percentage reduction in classification error (Lambda) = 86.2% N = 1780 *** -p < .001; ** -p < .01; * -p < .05, † -p < .10, one-tailed test Note: dependent variable is scored: vote Leave = 1, vote Remain = 0. *** -p < .001; ** -p < .01; * -p < .05, † -p < .10, one-tailed test Note: risk assessment scores vary from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating greater perceived risks of leaving the EU.
